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When are political institutions stable? When do they tend toward reform? This paper examines
a model of dynamic, endogenous institutional change. I introduce a class of dynamic political games
in which the political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date
t. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected.
It turns out that the stability of a political rule depends on whether its choices are dynamically
consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many
common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. More generally, the result applies
to an extended class of political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests,
threats, or private investment. The model makes use of an interpretation of rules as “players” who can
strategically delegate future policy-making authority to diﬀerent institutional types. The approach
can be viewed as a comprehensive way of understanding various explanations of institutional change
proposed in the literature. A parametric model of dynamic public goods provision gives an illustration.
JEL Codes: C73,D72, D74
Key Words and Phrases: Endogenous political institutions, recursive, dynamic political games,
reform, stability, dynamically consistent rules, forward and backward consistency, inessential.
∗Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057 USA. 202 687-1510.
lagunofr@georgetown.edu. http://www.georgetown.edu/lagunoff/lagunoff.htm . This project began
while the author visited Johns Hopkins University and the W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy at
the University of Rochester. I am grateful for their hospitality. I also thank two anonymous referees, and Daron
Acemoglu, Luca Anderlini, Jimmy Chan, Eddie Dekel, William Jack, Jim Jordan, Mark Stegeman, and seminar
participants at Berkeley, Cal Tech, Georgetown, Penn State, Toronto, VPI, Yale, the Penn PIER Conference,
and the Latin American and North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society for their helpful
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.
11 Introduction
Reforms of political institutions are common throughout history. They come in many varieties.
For example, periodic expansions of voting rights occurred in governments of ancient Athens
(700- 338BC), the Roman Republic (509BC-25AD), and most of Western Europe in the 19th
and early 20th centuries.1 Medieval Venice (1032-1300) altered its voting rule by gradually
lowering the required voting threshold from unanimity to a simple majority in its Citizens’
Council. Nineteenth century Prussia, where votes were initially weighted by one’s wealth,
eventually equalized the weights across all citizens. England and France changed the scope of
their decision authority by privatizing common land during the 16th and 17th century enclosure
movement.2 The U.S. government, by contrast, increased its scope under the 16th Amendment
by legalizing federal income tax in 1913.
The objective of this study is to understand what underlies a change in political institu-
tions over time. Speciﬁcally, which environments tend toward institutional stability? Which
environments admit change? What are the relevant forces that drive this change?
These questions are addressed in an inﬁnite horizon setting in which political institutions
are endogenous. The model has three critical features. First, political institutions arise in a
recursive social choice framework: a political rule in date t is a social choice correspondence
that aggregates preferences of the citizens at each date t to produce both a policy in date t
and a future political rule for date t + 1. Second, institutional choices are instrumental. That
is, the political rules do not enter payoﬀs or technology directly. Third, institutional choice is
wide and varied: the types of rules that can be chosen are not limited.
Admittedly, the social choice approach is abstract, far more so than, say, any particular
game-theoretic model of institutions. Its virtue is its ﬂexibility. Social choice rules can generally
capture the most elemental attributes of a polity without being mired in or overly sensitive to
the ﬁne details of political mechanisms. Questions of who participates; how are votes ultimately
counted; what types of policy choices are admissible, can all be accommodated in the present
framework. This study demonstrates how the approach can oﬀer a comprehensive way of
understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature.
The model is developed in two stages. First, a benchmark model posits that all decisions
occur in the public sector. The model is then extended to account for private decisions that
are not explicitly part of the polity. The main results concern the stability and reform of
political rules. A political rule is a social choice correspondence indexed by some parameter
θt that summarizes the formal procedures for governance, e.g., election laws, voting eligibility,
ﬁscal constitutions, and so on, that are in use at that date. A politically feasible strategy is an
endogenous law of motion that maps the prevailing political rule θt in date t to a possibly new
rule θt+1 for use in date t + 1. Politically feasible strategies are the “equilibria” of this model.
1See Fine (1983), Finer (1997), and Fleck and Hanssen (2003).
2See MacFarlane (1978) and Dahlman (1980).
1They are analogous to Subgame Perfect equilibria in the sense that the strategies must yield
implementable social choices after any history.
By deﬁnition, a political rule θt admits reform whenever the politically feasible strategy
maps θt to a diﬀerent rule θt+1 6= θt. That is, next period’s political rule is chosen to be
diﬀerent than the present one. A rule θt is stable whenever θt+1 = θt, i.e., no reform occurs.
The main concern of this study is therefore whether and when a rule is stable, or alternatively,
when does it admit reform?
To address this question, the present paper adopts an approach taken in a number of politico-
economic models of policy dating back at least to Krusell, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (1997).3 In
these models, policy outcomes are obtained by maximizing a time consistent social welfare
function or aggregator. Because the political rule is identiﬁed by an aggregator at each date, a
political rule can be re-interpreted as a “player” in a dynamic stochastic game. This player’s
“preferences” are those of the aggregator. In the present model, the political rule at t + 1 is
also a choice variable, and so a reform entails a strategic delegation of authority from one type
of “rule-as-player” to another. Rules are therefore stable when the current type chooses not to
delegate.
It turns out that the stability of such a rule can be characterized by its dynamic consistency
or lack thereof. A rule θt is said to satisfy forward dynamic consistency (FDC) if it is rationalized
by an aggregator in which the optimal choice of θt+1 in date t would remain optimal if the
decision were hypothetically made at the beginning of t + 1. In other words, the current rule
would not “change its mind” if called upon to make the decision in the future. The rule
θt satisﬁes backward dynamic consistency (BDC) if the hypothetical t + 1 choices are, in fact,
optimal at t. A dynamically consistent rule is one that is both FDC and BDC. Theorem 1 asserts
that any dynamically consistent rule is stable, and any stable rule is forwardly dynamically
consistent (FDC). Because FDC and BDC coincide when the choice of political rule is unique,
these notions provide an approximately complete characterization of stable political institutions.
In the paper, this notion is referred to as “rule-based dynamic consistency” in order to
distinguish it from consistency of an individual’s preferences. Rule-based dynamic consistency
has some similarities. Like individual consistency, rule based consistency concerns the conﬂict
between a decision maker’s current and his future “self” in evaluating tradeoﬀs.
However, unlike individual consistency, rule-based consistency comes from the internal work-
ings of a political system. A rule may be inconsistent (in the rule-based sense) even if all indi-
vidual preferences are perfectly consistent. For example, wealth-weighted voting rules, i.e., rules
in which an individual’s vote is weighted by his wealth, are usually dynamically inconsistent
in environments where wealth distribution changes through time. Hence, they admit reform.
Why? The reason is straightforward. The identity of a pivotal voter under wealth weighted
voting is sensitive to natural changes in the wealth distribution over time. But when the iden-
3See the Literature Review in Section 5.
2tity of the pivotal voter changes, a conﬂict arises in the preferences of the current and future
pivotal voters. So why does this translate into institutional change? Notice that the conﬂict
between present and future pivotal voter all occurs under a ﬁxed political rule θt. Hence, nom-
inal political authority remains the same, while de facto authority changes. Consequently, the
nominal delegation of authority from θt to θt+1 may be viewed as an attempt to limit a de facto
change due to a change in the wealth distribution.
By contrast, under standard formulations of technical change, the simple Majority Voting
rule is dynamically consistent, hence stable. The reason is that in these formulations, the
order statistics of the wealth distribution are preserved in expectation even as its higher order
moments change. In other words, if one individual is currently richer than another, then on
average he is expected to be richer tomorrow. Since simple majority voting typically depends
only on the median (an order statistic), the identity of the pivotal voter is not expected to
change.
Hence, while both individual and rule based consistency concern the conﬂicts between
present and future “self,” the latter also depends on subtleties of political aggregation. In
particular, as the wealth-weighted voting example demonstrates, the stability of a political rule
may depend on the internal structure of the rule itself, even in the absence of private sector
inﬂuences. This contrasts with the current literature on dynamically endogenous institutions.
That literature tends to focus on extra-legal protests, usurpations of power, or other activi-
ties that are not directly part of the polity.4 For example, in an inﬂuential paper Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000) argue that expansions of the voting franchise were used by the 19th
century European elite to “buy oﬀ” the threat of a peasant revolt. The rationale for reform
then comes from the fact that institutional change solves a commitment or credibility problem
when a government’s policies can be undone by private behavior - in this case the peasants’
threat. Similar rationales for change are found in Justman and Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001, 2005), Lagunoﬀ (2001), Gradstein (2003), Greif and Laitin (2004), Jack
and Lagunoﬀ (2006a,b), Cervellati, et. al. (2006), and Gradstein (2007).5
Even if the various “external threat” theories of institutional change are correct, rule-based
consistency oﬀers a comprehensive way of understanding them. To show this is so, the full
model incorporates arbitrary private activities such as those examined in the literature. An
equilibrium of this full model consists of politically feasible public sector strategies and Subgame
Perfect private sector ones. Despite the addition of private sector activities, our main result
shows that the previous result extends to this environment. That is, when political aggregation
encompasses both public and private decisions, dynamically consistent “extended rules” are
shown to be stable, and stable rules are forwardly dynamically consistent (Theorem 2).
Returning to the “external threat” explanation of reform, the idea of rule-based consistency
adds to main two insights. First, it provides a concise characterization of the diﬀering incentives
4One exception is Messner and Polborn (2004). See Section 5 for a further discussion.
5This literature and related work is discussed in detail in Section 5.
3of government at various points in time. For example, the Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
argument in which the franchise expansion ameliorates the threat of a peasant revolt may be
re-interpreted as a failure of dynamic consistency of the extended aggregator. In the absence of
institutional change, the elite responds to the private sector threat under the assumption that
the future elite does not. Hence, a conﬂict between present and future objectives arises.
Second, rule-based consistency shows that seemingly distinct explanation for reform are, in
fact, the same underlying explanation. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) explanation
for franchise expansion is sometimes contrasted with that of Lizzeri and Persico’s (2004) who
posit an “internal conﬂict” rationale for reform. In their model, political competition induces
over-investment in redistributive transfers relative to public goods. This over-investment is more
severe in a restricted voting franchise, and so franchise expansion is in some cases unanimously
preferred among the elite. Though the Lizzeri-Persico model is static, there is, nevertheless,
a tension between the extended rule’s “objectives” before and after the results of the political
competition. The ineﬃciency might be mitigated if, for instance, citizens could commit to
contingent votes before the political competition begins. Hence, in both papers, private sector
activities account for institutional reform only insofar as they induce dynamically inconsistent
political aggregation. We illustrate this phenomenon as well in an Example in Section 4.
Section 2 introduces the benchmark model. Section 3 contains the results of that model
and goes on to illustrate the main trade-oﬀs involved in keeping or changing a political rule
in a parametric example of public goods provision. Section 4 extends the model to private
sector decisions and revisits the parametric example with private decisions included. Section 5
discusses the related literature in more detail, placing the present model in the context of that
literature. Section 6 is an Appendix with the proofs of all the results.
2 The Benchmark Model
This Section introduces the benchmark model of a pure public sector economy. For now, we
abstract away from all private sector behavior such as individuals’ savings, investment, or labor
decisions. Hence, in this benchmark model, all relevant decisions are carried out in the public
sector. Though not realistic, this benchmark isolates some of the relevant features of a political
institution in order to determine its stability. Private sector behavior is later introduced into
the model in Section 4.
To lay the groundwork for the model, an illustration of the social choice approach is intro-
duced below. The approach is then extended to an inﬁnite horizon dynamic game which admits
the potential for continual changes in the political rule itself. Though the model developed here
is abstract, Section 3 illustrates the ideas in a concrete parametric model.
42.1 A Social Choice Illustration
Before proceeding with the model, consider ﬁrst a simple static social choice “illustration” to
ﬁx ideas. Let I = {1,...,n} denote a society of individuals, with n odd, and let P denote
a set of possible collective decisions or policies. These policies may be tax rates, allocations
of public goods, or pork. Each citizen i ∈ I has payoﬀ function vi : P → I R deﬁned on the
policy space. A standard social choice approach entails that policies are chosen from a social
choice correspondence, C, that maps each preference proﬁle (v1(·),...,vn(·)) (from a set of such
proﬁles) to a subset of policies C(v1(·),...,vn(·)) ⊆ P.
This standard model can, in fact, be extended to allow for choice of the correspondence
itself. Let Θ be an index set. Each parameter θ ∈ Θ is identiﬁed with a distinct social choice
correspondence C(·,θ). Hence, given an index θ and a proﬁle (v1(·),...,vn(·)), a policy p ∈ P
is politically feasible if p ∈ C(v1(·),...,vn(·), θ).
The index θ is, in a sense, a political rule since it summarizes society’s aggregation process as
deﬁned by the correspondence C(·,θ). The classic choice between “dictatorship” and “majori-
tarian democracy,” for instance, may now be represented as a choice between two parameters,
θD and θM. Parameter θD is deﬁned by: p ∈ C(v1(·),...,vn(·), θD) if p maximizes vi for some
individual i (the “dictator”). θM is deﬁned as: p ∈ C(v1(·),...,vn(·), θM) if p is undominated
by any alternative ˆ p in a simple majority vote. The problem in this static setup is: what rule
determines the choice over these two rules? A dynamic model solves this problem by supposing
that the choice between θD and θM for date t always takes place at a prior date in accordance
with the rule in use at that time.
2.2 A Dynamic Extension of the Social Choice Model
From here on, all deﬁned sets are assumed to be Borel measurable subsets of Euclidian spaces,
and all feasible choice spaces (e.g., the space of feasible policies) are assumed to be compact.
At each date t = 0,1,2,... society must collectively choose a policy pt ∈ P. Each citizen i
has a payoﬀ in each date given by ui(ωt,pt) where ωt is a state variable drawn from a set,
Ω. The state can include a citizen’s asset holdings or any stock of physical or human capital
that aﬀects the citizen’s payoﬀs. ui is assumed to be continuous and nonnegative. The state
evolves according to a Markov transition technology q with q(B| ωt, pt) the probability that
ωt+1 belongs to the (Borel) set B ⊆ Ω given the current state ωt and current policy pt. For











where δ is the common discount factor, and the expectation Eq[·] is taken with respect to
Markov transition q. The expectation in (1) is assumed to be ﬁnite for any feasible sequence
5of states and policy choices.
Extending the notation of the static model, let θt ∈ Θ denote the prevailing political rule
at date t. The collective decision faced by a society at date t under rule θt is the choice pair
(pt,θt+1), i.e., the choice of current policy and subsequent political rule. The composite state,
st = (ωt,θt), consists of the economic state and the political rule. The set of states is S = Ω×Θ.
A history at date t is the list ht = ((s0,p0),...,(st−1,pt−1),st) which includes all past data up
to that point in time as well as the current state st = (ωt,θt). An initial history is given by
h0 = (s0,∅). Let H denote the set of all histories at all dates.
Society’s endogenous choices are summarized by a public strategy, a pair of decision func-
tions ψ and µ, deﬁned as follows. Given a history ht ∈ H, ψ determines the chosen policy
pt = ψ(ht) while µ determines the political rule θt+1 = µ(ht) chosen for next period.6 The in-
stitutional strategy µ is of particular interest since it describes an endogenous dynamic process
of institutional change from current to future rules. Denote the sets of each type of strategy by
Ψ and M, respectively. After any history ht ∈ H, a public strategy (ψ,µ) ∈ Ψ × M produces
a public decision, (ψ(ht),µ(ht)) = (pt,θt+1) which determines today’s policy and tomorrow’s
political rule for this society. Each citizen’s continuation payoﬀ is expressed recursively as
Vi(h
t; ψ,µ) = (1 − δ) ui(ωt,ψ(h











In (2), µ matters only indirectly through the policy strategy ψ since ψ may vary with the
current and past θs.
Notice that Vi(ht; ψ,µ) is a payoﬀ, i.e., a scalar. However, social choice rules are deﬁned on
proﬁles of preference orderings rather than payoﬀs, and so we use the notation Vi(ht; ·), with
the “dot” used as a placeholder for a public strategy (ψ,µ), and connoting citizen i’s preference
ordering over all (ψ,µ) ∈ Ψ × M.
We now have all the tools to deﬁne social choice in the dynamic model. As in the static
model, a political rule θt is an index for a social choice correspondence C. The diﬀerence is
that now C maps to strategies rather than outcomes. Formally, (ψ,µ) ∈ C(V (ht; ·), st )
expresses the idea that the strategy (ψ,µ) is a feasible social choice of the correspondence
C(·,st) under the preference proﬁle V (ht; ·) ≡ (V1(ht; ·),...Vn(ht; ·) ) following history ht.7
Notice that C varies with “economic” state ωt as well as the political rule θt. This is natural
if the aggregation procedure makes use of economic information such as wealth. However, C
is assumed to have no structural dependence on past history. Indirect dependence can arise
through citizens’ preferences. The pair (C,Θ) is referred to as the class of political rules.
6Strictly speaking ψ and µ need not be “strategic” choices. They could arise, for instance, from a purely
mechanical process. For much of the analysis, however, these will be explicit strategic choices of some “Player”
and so I just label them as “strategies” from the start.
7Formally, C( V (ht; ·), st ) ⊂ Ψ × M is a cylinder set. What this means is that C( V (ht; ·), st ) is a set of
(ψ,µ) such that (ψ(hτ),µ(hτ)) can take on any value in P ×Θ if τ < t. In other words, there are no restrictions
on public decisions prior to date t.
6Suppose initially that this society could commit permanently to a ﬁxed law of motion
for political rules and policies. In that case, the social decision occurs once at t = 0. The
solution, a public strategy (ψ,µ), then induces a distribution over paths (p0,θ1),(p1,θ2),...,
fully determined in advance. A “politically feasible strategy” in this sense would satisfy
(ψ,µ) ∈ C( V (h
0; ·), s0 ) ∀h
0 (3)
At this point the dynamic model extends the static model in a straightforward way. Of course,
a commitment of this type is arguably impossible in any real society. The Expression (3) is
necessary but not suﬃcient for “political feasibility” in the recursive, “time consistent” sense. In
order to satisfy the lack of strategic commitment, feasible strategies at date t must be consistent
with feasible strategies at date t + 1. That is,
(ψ,µ) ∈ C( V (h
t; ·), st ) ∀h
t ∀t = 0,1,..., (4)
A politically feasible strategy is therefore a strategy (ψ,µ) which satisﬁes (4). On occasion we
will look at politically feasible strategies (ψ,µ) that vary only with the current (Markov) state
st = (ωt,θt). We refer to these as politically feasible Markov strategies (or just “Markov-feasible
strategies” for short).
Political feasibility is analogous to Subgame Perfection since strategies must be politically
feasible at each date and after any history. To emphasize the link with Subgame Perfection,
consider the special case of a “Libertarian” political rule in which public decisions mimic pri-
vately chosen activities. Let P ⊂ I R
n where pi is chosen directly by the corresponding citizen
i each period. Now let Θ = {θ} where C(·, ω,θ) is the set of Nash equilibria in the subgame
starting from t. The set of politically feasible strategies in this case is precisely the set of
Subgame Perfect strategies of the n-player stochastic game. This “Libertarian” example also
shows that the social choice approach is not at odds with a more traditional noncooperative
game approach. In the latter, each political rule could be modeled explicitly as a noncooper-
ative game, with the choice being over noncooperative games in future periods. The problem
is: how should these game(s) be modeled? While there are agreed upon canonical social choice
representations of voting, there are relatively few such games, perhaps because strategic models
of politics are notoriously sensitive to minor details.8 Robust results in noncooperative political
game models are therefore hard to obtain. Consequently, this paper exploits a “detail free”
approach that models basic properties of polities without specifying the ﬁne details.
3 Stability versus Reform
Fix a class of political rules, (C,Θ). Recall that a history ht includes the current state st =
(ωt,θt) as well as all past policies and states. Denote by ht(θt) a history in which the political
8Even in the more canonical endogenous candidate models of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinsky (1996) there are reasonable and numerous, alternative speciﬁcations of how candidates could emerge.
7rule at date t is θt ∈ Θ. Given an institutional strategy µ, a political rule θt ∈ Θ admits
institutional reform in µ if there exists a date t and a set of histories ht(θt) of positive measure
such that µ(ht(θt)) 6= θt.9 Alternatively, a rule θt is stable in µ if it does not admit reform, i.e,
if µ(ht(θt)) = θt for almost every ht(θt).
This study poses the question: when do political rules admit reform? When are they stable?
Our main result shows that this question can be reduced to one checking whether the aggregator
satisﬁes a certain “dynamic consistency” property. To motivate the result, we ﬁrst examine the
issue in a parametric special case of the model.
3.1 A Simple Parametric Model
In this section, we explore a parametric special case of the model. We assume a political
institution determines the level of taxes in order to fund a durable public good such as public
literacy. The economic state is ωt = (Gt,yt), where yt = (y1t,...,ynt) with yit the wealth of
Citizen i at date t (e.g, a parcel of land). Wealth yit produces a one-to-one return each period
of yit. Gt is the stock of a durable public good at t. The public good in period t + 1 depends
on tax revenues in period t. A tax pt is imposed on the yield from one’s wealth/land. There
is no depreciation. The transition law for the public good is deterministic and is given by
Gt+1 = Gt + (pt
P
j yjt)γ, 0 < γ < 1. Finally, each citizen’s stage payoﬀ is a linear function of
his after-tax returns and his use of the public good: ui = (1 − pt)yit + Gt.
There are two possible institutional choices: θM and θW. The political rule θM is the
Majority Rule, whereas θW is the “Wealth-as-Power Rule” in which each individual is allocated
a number of votes proportional to his wealth. According to our deﬁnition in (4), a politically
feasible strategy is one that satisﬁes





k) ∀k = M,W, ∀t
Formally, what this means is that under the rule θM, for any alternative strategy ( ˆ ψ, ˆ µ), the
set of individuals that prefer (ˆ ψ, ˆ µ) are not a majority, i.e,
J ≡ {i ∈ I : Vi(h
t; ˆ ψ, ˆ µ) > Vi(h
t; ψ,µ)}






9Positive measure here refers to the joint distribution on t-period histories induced by q, ψ and µ. Fixing
initial history h0 and rewriting history ht as ht = (h0,(ω1,...ωt),(θ1,...,θt),(p1,...,pt−1), the measure on
histories ht is deﬁned by the product measure qt ⊗1{µt} ⊗1{ψt−1} where 1{·} denotes the dirac measures on Θt
and Pt respectively.
10The theoretical properties of wealth-weighted rules are typically diﬃcult to characterize. In a purely redis-
tributive environment, Jordan (2006) shows that outcomes of the Wealth-as-Power rule correspond to the core
of a cooperative game in which a blocking coalition’s feasible allocations are determined endogenously by the
status quo allocation.
8Case A. Fixed Wealth Distribution. Suppose ﬁrst that the wealth distribution yt = (y1t,...,ynt)
is ﬁxed for all time, so that yt = y for all t. Order individual wealth holdings from poorest
to richest: 0 ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ ··· ≤ yn. Denote aggregate wealth by Y =
P
j yj. In this case,




i } where A = (
γδ
1−δY γ)1/(1−γ) is a constant. Evidently, when
preferred tax rates are interior, wealthier citizens prefer lower taxes.
Politically feasible strategies in each rule are as follows. Given θM, let mt denote the identity
of the Majority-pivotal voter at date t. Voter mt corresponds to the citizen with the median
wealth endowment, i.e., mt = m = (n + 1)/2. The identity of this individual never changes
over time. Consequently, the resulting policy is ψ(ω,θM) = min{1,Ay−1/(1−γ)
m }.
Under the Wealth-as-Power rule, the pivotal decision maker is also time invariant. A policy is
feasible under θW if it is the ideal policy of a voter, denoted by w, with the “median wealth” in an
economy with yi identical voters of type i ∈ I. More precisely, this voter may be found as follows:




i yi/2}. The preferred policy for this individual
is p∗
w = min{1,Ay−1/(1−γ)
w }. The resulting policy then is ψ(ω,θW) = min{1,Ay−1/(1−γ)
w }.
Proposition 1 In Case A, both θM and θW are stable.
Intuitively, each rule can be associated with a single, dynamically consistent decision maker - the
pivotal citizen. The question becomes: would this individual ever delegate decision authority to
a diﬀerent individual whose preference over policy is diﬀerent than his own? By the Principle
of Unimprovability (e.g., Howard (1960)) the answer is no.
B. Diﬀerential Wealth Accumulation. Suppose that at t = 0 the initial wealth distribution is
yi0 = yi where yi is the same as before. Recall that y1 ≤ ··· ≤ yn. Rather than remaining
ﬁxed, suppose that for t ≥ 1, yi t+1 = yit + βi with β > 0,
P
j βj = 1, and β1 < ··· < βn.
In this example, wealthier citizens accumulate wealth faster than poorer ones. One can check








t )1/(1−γ) which now varies exogenously over time.
Under the diﬀerential accumulation rates, however, the two rules generally operate quite
diﬀerently. Under the Majority Rule, the ordering of the wealth endowments never changes.
Consequently, as before, the identity of the Majority-pivotal voter m never changes. This
voter’s wealth at date t is given by ymt. Hence, while the policy itself may change over time
according to ψ(ωt,θM) = min{1,Aty
−1/(1−γ)
mt }, the Majority-pivotal citizen has no incentive to
delegate decision authority to another. Therefore, the Majority rule remains stable.
By contrast, under the Wealth-as-Power rule, the identity of the pivotal voter may change
over time. This gives a potential rationale for institutional reform: a current decision maker
whose wealth is close to ymt may prefer the Majority-pivotal voter as a “lesser of two evils.”
To illustrate this starkly, suppose that the parameters of the model are such that each citizen’s









→ βn > 1/2
as t → ∞. In other words, the richest citizen eventually accumulates over half the aggregate
wealth. Letting {wt} denote the sequence of pivotal decision makers under θW, the policy
strategy is given by ψ(ωt,θW) = Aty
−1/(1−γ)
wtt . It is clear that at some date t∗,
w0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ ··· ≤ wt∗ = n
Now consider a suﬃciently egalitarian initial wealth distribution. Speciﬁcally, suppose
P(n+1)/2
i=1 yi >
Y/2. This implies that w0 = m. That is, the initial pivotal decision maker under θW is precisely
the Majority-pivotal (median) voter.
In this case, the institutional choice is made easy. Starting from θW, the Citizen w0 = m will
choose θM. Clearly, by remaining in θW, decision making authority is eventually transferred
from the median citizen to the richest one. By choosing θM, however, this median citizen
retains power. In the more general case where w0 6= m, this Citizen w0 may choose θM if his
preferences more closely resemble m’s over time than n’s. To summarize:
Proposition 2 In Case B, suppose an initial state ω0 = (y,G0) such that
P(n+1)/2
i=1 yi > Y/2.
Then θM is stable, while θW admits reform. In particular, there exists some date t such that
µ(ht(θW)) = θM.
Since the preference of type m is strict, the Majority rule is preferred in all states in a neigh-
borhood of ωτ. Hence, θW admits a reform toward θM.
The instability of θW owes to the fact that it varies in the economic state ωt. This leads
to change in the “identity” of the policy maker. If the shift is substantial enough, the current
decision maker under θW may select an alternative political rule for self protection. Because
the Majority Rule retains the same pivotal decision maker over time, no such self-protection is
necessary.11
3.2 A Baseline Result
The intuition of the parametric model demonstrates that a rule’s stability is closely aligned
with its tendency to “preserve a public decision maker’s identity” over time. Some parts of
this statement need to be clariﬁed. First, the idea of a rule’s “identity” must be deﬁned. We
associate a political rule with a social objective function or aggregator, whose maximal elements
11A related result is found in Messner and Polborn (2004) who use dynamic inconsistencies in the preferences
of the individual citizens. See Literature Review (Section 5) for more details.
10are the outcomes of the rule. Formally, a class of rules (C,Θ) is rationalized by an aggregator
F : I R
n
+ × S → I R+ if for any politically feasible strategy (ψ,µ),
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An aggregator is a social welfare function that identiﬁes a rule with a sequentially rational
“player” whose payoﬀ over public decisions each period is maximized by politically feasible
strategies. It should be emphasized that this deﬁnition is unrestrictive: any class (C,Θ) is
rationalized by a constant function.12
Having deﬁned an aggregator F that rationalizes (C,Θ), we also need to be clear about
what “preserving the aggregator’s identity” really means.
Deﬁnition 1 Let (C,Θ) be a class of political rules. Let F be an aggregator that rationalizes
(C,Θ), and let (ψ,µ) be any public strategy. A rule θt is then said to be forwardly dynamically
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A rule is backwardly dynamically consistent (BDC) if (6) holds under the reverse inclusion, “⊇.”
A rule is dynamically consistent if it is both FDC and BDC.
A rule θt is therefore FDC if any choice of rule θt+1 that maximizes F(·,ωt,θt) also maximizes
the expected continuation E[F(·,ωt+1,θt)]. A rule is BDC if the hypothetical maximizers of
E[F(·,ωt+1,θt)] also maximize F(·,ωt,θt). Signiﬁcantly, this deﬁnition does not say anything
about what the solution to either maximization problem should be.
Generally speaking, both forward and backward consistency capture the idea that, in the
absence of new information, such an individual should not “change his mind” about about a
decision simply because the date at which the decision is made has changed. Alternatively,
consistency can be formulated in terms of the value of commitment — a dynamically consistent
decision maker is one for whom there is no value of commitment.
Clearly, this is not a new idea. Individual consistency dates back at least to Howard (1960).
Here, however, consistency is property of a rule rather than an individual. To make sense of
12One could therefore strengthen the deﬁnition in (5) so that (C,Θ) is fully rationalized by F means the
politically feasible strategies coincide with (rather than contained in) the set of maximizers of F. This eliminates
the degenerate cases, but it entails some loss of generality. Not every class of rules is fully rationalized by an
aggregator. In any case, since the results do not depend on which deﬁnition is used, I opt for the weaker
deﬁnition.
11this, we interpret a rule θt as a “player” who delegates authority to some possibly diﬀerent
“player” θt+1 for next period. Hence, FDC states that, whatever political rule θt+1 happens
to be chosen at date t, the aggregator F will not “change its mind” once the stage payoﬀs
from period t have been realized. Similarly, BDC means if the aggregator were hypothetically
allowed to choose θt+1 at the beginning of date t + 1 (before the new state is realized), this
aggregator would not “change its mind” if instead it could commit to a decision at date t.
While neither FDC and BDC implies the other, in the important case where the maximizing
sets in (6) are singletons (or, alternatively, both sets of maximizers are empty), then BDC and
FDC coincide. We emphasize that while rule based consistency appears similar to individual
consistency, it ultimately comes from characteristics of political aggregation.
Before proceeding with the Theorem below, we have one ﬁnal caveat: in order to exclude
answers that depend only on “ties,” deﬁne a conservative feasible strategy to be one in which
µ(ht(θ)) = θ whenever θ maximizes the aggregator F. In other words, θ avoids reform unless
there is a strict incentive to change. “Ties” favor the status quo. Conservative strategies arise
naturally in any environment in which there is a small cost to changing the status quo.
Theorem 1 Let (C,Θ) be a class of political rules, and let F be an aggregator that rationalizes
(C,Θ). For any conservative politically feasible strategy (ψ,µ), every dynamically consistent
political rule θt is stable, and every stable rule θt is forwardly dynamically consistent.
Heuristically, dynamic consistency ⇒ stability ⇒ FDC. Here, FDC is clearly the key concept.
The proof in the Appendix is not deep. It extends the intuition of the Parametric model in a
straightforward way. In Case A of that model, both θM and θW are dynamically consistent due
to the constant wealth distribution. However, in Case B the instability of the Wealth-is-Power
Rule arises from a natural violation of FDC. Namely, θW varies in the economic state ωt. This
leads to change in the “identity” of the public decision maker. Reform therefore occurs as a
de jure response to a change in de facto power. Indeed, any political rule which depends on
cardinal properties of a distribution of tastes or income is susceptible to nonlinear changes in
this distribution.
Consider the wealth-weighted voting rules such as θW. Though they have been widely used
historically, they are often short-lived. An example is 19th century Prussia. In 1849, voting
rights were extended to most citizens in Prussia, but not in an even-handed way. Rights were
accorded proportionately to the percentage of taxes paid. The electorate was divided into
thirds, each third given equal weight in the voting. The wealthiest individuals who accounted
for the ﬁrst third of taxes paid accounted for 3.5% of the population. The next wealthiest group
that accounted for the middle third accounted for 10-12% of the population. The remainder
accounted for the remaining third. Following a growth spurt in the late 19th century, the
wealth-weights were eliminated and a majority rule was adopted (see Finer (1997)).
Some ﬁnal remarks conclude this Section. First, the model does not establish existence of
12a politically feasible strategy. This issue is omitted in this paper, however, it is the subject of
a companion paper (Lagunoﬀ 2006b).
Second, the Parametric Model illustrates only one source of inconsistency. There are others.
A rule could, for instance, fail to be dynamic consistent if a particular citizen’s preference
exhibits an inconsistency.13 It must be emphasized, however, that rule-based inconsistencies
are not dependent on individual inconsistencies.14 The particular source of inconsistency in the
Wealth-as-Power rule is a natural one arising from the rule’s reliance on a current economic
status quo and from its over-sensitivity to subsequent changes in that status quo.
Third, in standard macro models featuring a social planner, the types of tradeoﬀs illustrated
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The expression (7) corresponds to the standard social planner’s problem according to which
F is linearly separable and does not directly vary in the economic states ωt. The Parametric
Model illustrates how simple and common political rules violate the standard assumptions, and,
consequently, will not last if the economic state changes in a natural way.
Finally, whether or not a particular rule is dynamically consistent can depend on Θ. For
instance, if Θ = {θM} in the Parametric Model, then F is dynamically consistent, but expanding
to Θ = {θM,θW} destroys consistency, as illustrated in the Model.15 Along the same lines,
dynamic consistency can also depend on the class, though not necessarily the precise functional
form, of strategies under consideration. For example, a rule that is inconsistent under the
Markov strategies may well be consistent in a class of trigger strategies that makes full use of
the history of the game. The latter can create consistent choices by means of self enforcing
punishments that sustain the desired outcomes.16 The link between consistency and the strategy
will become more apparent when the polity must confront private actions of the citizens.
4 Private Sector Decisions
In the benchmark model, there are no private decisions of individuals; all decisions are made
through the polity whose form depends on the political rule. One reason for considering private
13See, for instance, Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) or Messner and Polborn (2004).
14See Lagunoﬀ (2006a) or Amador (2006) for models of dynamic inconsistencies arising from (exogenous)
electoral or dynastic changes.
15I thank a referee for pointing this out.
16See, for example, Dutta (1995) for a Folk Theorem for stochastic games.
13or external decisions is that they are thought to be a driving force for institutional change in the
literature. Section 5 explores this literature in more detail. Whether or not this view is correct,
this Section demonstrates that private decisions such as extra-legal protests, usurpations, labor
and investments decisions, and so on, can be incorporated into an “extended political rule” to
which main result still applies.
Let eit denote i’s private decision at date t, chosen from a (compact) feasible set E. A proﬁle
of private decisions is et = (e1t,...,ent ). These decisions may capture any number of activities,
including labor eﬀort, savings, or investment activities. They may also include “non-economic”
activities such as religious worship or one’s participation in a social revolt. The distinction
between eit and pt is that while the latter is collectively determined, the former is necessarily
chosen individually. Yet, in the larger sense described below, the individual decisions just reﬂect
constraints on the overall social choice correspondence.
In keeping with the standard deﬁnition of a stochastic game, both private decisions et and
the public decision pt are made simultaneously. Clearly, there are sequential move alternatives,
but none are clearly more compelling. In real time, private and public decisions are on-going.
It seems natural then to deﬁne the dates as those intervals of time in which no agent is able to
publicly pre-empt another.
Let ui(ωt,et,pt) and q(B| ωt, et, pt) denote the citizen stage payoﬀ and transition probabil-
ity, respectively. Both now depend on the proﬁle of private actions as well as the public ones.











4.1 Equilibrium and Extended Rules
A history at date t now includes the private action proﬁles, eτ, τ < t. A private strategy for
individual i is a history-contingent action, i.e., a function σi : H → Ei that prescribes action
eit = σi(ht) after history ht. Let σ = (σ1,...,σn). A strategy proﬁle is a list (σ,ψ,µ), which
includes both private and public strategies. A citizen’s dynamic payoﬀ may now be expressed
as Vi(ht; σ,ψ,µ). As before, V (ht; σ,ψ,µ) = (Vi(ht; σ,ψ,µ) )i∈I.
Deﬁnition 2 An Equilibrium of a dynamic political game G is a proﬁle (σ,ψ,µ) of strategies
such that for all histories ht ∈ H,
(a) Private rationality: For each citizen i, and each private strategy ˆ σi,
Vi(h
t; σ,ψ,µ) ≥ Vi(h
t; ˆ σi,σ−i,ψ,µ ) (8)
14(b) Political feasibility: Public strategies are politically feasible given σ:







A Markov equilibrium is an equilibrium in Markov strategies. As before, equilibria, Markov or
otherwise, satisfy a “subgame perfection” requirement.
Because the political rule (C,Θ) does not generally coincide with the interests of any private
decision maker, it will not be the case that the public decision can be coordinated with any
citizen’s private one. Rather than carving out an exception, Deﬁnition 2 does not allow for
coordinated deviations between private and public decision makers even if they are one of the
same. While this restriction enlarges the equilibrium set, there is an obvious way to circumvent
this issue by an appropriate reclassiﬁcation of private decisions as public ones (along the lines of
the “Libertarian” rule) whenever the public decision maker is one of the citizens. Indeed, even
when this is not the case, the map C can be extended to include private decisions. Formally,
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We refer to a political rule θ∗ associated with the extended class (C∗,Θ) as an extended political
rule. Here, extended political rules incorporate private as well as public decisions.17 The
aggregator F ∗ is constructed so that it gives the same outcome as a “centralized” political system
that would have occurred under in equilibrium under the “decentralized” political system in
which public and private decisions are kept separate. F ∗ is therefore a “player” whose payoﬀ is
maximized by an equilibrium (σ,ψ,µ). In this sense, we extend the rules-as-players approach
developed in the previous Sections extends in a straightforward way to the extended class
(C∗,Θ).
4.2 A Theorem
For the remainder of the Section, ﬁx a class (C,Θ) of political rules, and let (C∗,Θ) be the
extended class. Let F ∗ be an aggregator which rationalizes (C∗,Θ).
Theorem 2 Let (σ,ψ,µ) be any conservative equilibrium. Then any dynamically consistent
extended political rule θ∗ ∈ Θ is stable, and any stable extended rule θ∗ is forwardly dynamically
consistent.
17Although the extended rule θ∗ comes from the same index set Θ as before.
15The proof has two steps. First, an appropriate relabeling of variables is required in order to
apply the proof of Theorem 1. This involves taking private sector actions and appropriating
them to the government or public sector. Private sector or individually chosen actions are
therefore part of a general social choice problem in which the social choice rule delegates decision
authority over certain variables to the individual citizens. The second step repeats the steps of
the Theorem 1 proof. We omit the details.
Despite the straightforward proof, the consequences are diﬀerent from that of Theorem
1 because the tension is between diﬀerent agents rather than between diﬀerent incarnations
of a political institution at diﬀerent points in time. These consequences are illustrated in a
parametric example below. The parametric structure is the same as before except that private
decisions are included.
4.3 Adding a Private Sector to the Parametric Model
We revisit the parametric example, adding a private sector to the production of a public good.
As before, the economic state is ωt = (Gt,y) with Gt a durable public good and y the wealth
distribution assumed here to be exogenous. Let 0 = y1 < ··· < yn. Given  > 0 small, assume
n is suﬃciently large and the wealth distribution y “evenly distributed” in the sense that y1 < 
and yj −yj−1 < . Now assume that each citizen can contribute labor eﬀort eit at time t toward




with 0 < γ < 1. Increased public literacy, for example, requires both public capital as given
by (pt
P
j yj)γ and the sum of individual eﬀort,
P
j ejt. Payoﬀs each period are deﬁned by
ui = yi(1 − pt) + Gt − e2
it, now reﬂecting the cost or disutility of eﬀort.18
Let (C,Θ) be a class of pivotal rules deﬁned as those in which one of the citizens, say, citizen
i with wealth yit is the dictator/pivotal voter. In that case, θt = yit. Given a state summarized
by st = (Gt,y,θt), a strategy (σ,ψ,µ) deﬁnes a law of motion over future states, e.g.,






σjt(st), y, µ(st) ).
To ﬁnd a closed form solution for an equilibrium, we restrict attention in the example to
Markov equilibria — equilibria in which strategies vary only with the state st. A citizen’s payoﬀ
may then be expressed recursively by
Vi(st;σ,ψ,µ) = (1 − δ)[yi(1 − ψ(st)) + Gt − (σi(st))
2] + δVi(st+1;σ,ψ,µ)
Since each political rule is dictatorial, the class of rules is alternatively rationalized by a simple
aggregator corresponding to the dictator’s payoﬀ, .i.e.,
F(V (st; σ,ψ,µ),st) = (1−δ)[θt(1−ψ(st))+Gt−(σit(st))
2]+δ F(V (st+1; σ,ψ,µ),st+1) (10)
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Rule at
t + 1
Political Rule at t
Figure 1: A Linear Rule in Wealth Endowment
Using this aggregator, the Proposition below characterizes an approximation to a Markov
equilibrium.






















and µ(θt) is the wealth level in {yi}i∈I satisfying ||µ(θt)− ¯ µθt|| <  where 0 < ¯ µ < 1 a constant










Figure 1 illustrates the simple dynamics of the equilibrium path of rules. Every type except
y1 (the lowest) admits a reform downward. The unique stable political rule therefore is θ = y1.
The intuition is as follows. The degree of complementarity between the tax rate and eﬀort is
determined by γ. When γ > 1/2, taxes (i.e., spending on the public good) and eﬀort are highly
17complementary and so eﬀort is ineﬃciently high in equilibrium. On the other hand, when
γ < 1/2, the degree of complementarity is small, and so the free rider problem in private eﬀort
predominates: eﬀort is too low. In either case, the current dictator has an incentive to delegate
future authority to an individual with lower wealth. When γ < 1/2, eﬀort that is too low in
equilibrium can be increased by transferring decision authority to a dictator from the lower
wealth strata. The transfer of power represents a commitment to a higher tax rate. Similarly,
when γ > 1/2, excessively high eﬀort can be reduced by the same such transfer, in this case
representing a commitment to a lower tax rate. In either case, the rich type cedes authority to
the poor type to gain more favorable private sector eﬀort from the rest of the citizenry.
This private sector rationale seems quite diﬀerent from the internal problems that created
instability in the wealth-as-power rule in the previous example. Theorem 2, however, suggests
that it is not. Consider what the extended aggregator would look like in this case. Let θ∗
t
denote an extended rule, and let s∗
t = (Gt,y,θ∗
t). By reverse-engineering the equilibrium in


















2]+δ F(V (st+1; σ,ψ,µ),st+1)
(13)
Compare this F ∗ to F deﬁned in (10). There are two main diﬀerences. First, the current stage
payoﬀ in F ∗ eliminates the decentralization of, hence the free rider problem in, labor decisions.
All citizens’ labor decisions are included, not just those of the dictator. Second, in order to
“compensate” for the lack of a free rider problem, the current dictator’s wealth is now deﬂated
by 1
n (by assuming a type θ∗/n rather than θ∗). Intuitively, a wealthy dictator would like to
commit to act as if he were a poorer agent.
The key observation is that extended aggregator is adjusted so as to yield the same outcome
that would have been obtained in the decentralized model with private decisions. It does so by
reformulating the decentralized problem as a centralized one with a dynamically inconsistent
aggregator. Because the aggregator F ∗ has the same continuation as F but a diﬀerent stage
payoﬀ, it exhibits a dynamic inconsistency between objectives at date t and those of t+1. This
inconsistency is not unlike that of hyperbolic models. The conﬂict is induced by the decision
maker’s lack of direct control over private sector activities.
Consequently, Theorem 2 may be applied as follows to show that in a Markov equilibrium,
the extended rule θ∗ = y1 is dynamically consistent (hence is stable) while every other extended
political rule fails FDC (hence admits a reform). To see this, consider the extended class as
given by (13), and substitute the Markov equilibrium in the Proposition in the deﬁnition of F ∗.


















 + δF(V (ωt+1,θt+1; σ,ψ,µ) (14)
19For a derivation, see the Appendix Proof to Proposition 3.
18is equivalent to argmax
θt+1
F
∗(V (ωt+1,θt+1; σ,ψ,µ). In fact, this equivalence does not hold for all
extended rules except at the lower bound, θ∗ = y1.
5 Summary and Review of Literature
The idea of identifying a political institution with a time consistent social objective function
is not new. Krusell, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (1997), Hassler, et. al. (2005), and many others
have used it to model endogenous policy.20 The present paper builds on that idea by examining
the choice of institution itself as a part of the aggregator’s objective. The model blends ideas
from both social choice and stochastic games to produce a law of motion for political rules in
which current rules select future ones. A stable rule is one that selects itself for use in the
future. Stable rules can be understood in terms of a rule based dynamic consistency concept
that identiﬁes a rule with an aggregator.
This notion of self-selection bears some relation to “self-selected rules” in the static social
choice models of Koray (2000) and Barbera and Jackson (2000), and also to the inﬁnite regress
model of endogenous choice of rules by Lagunoﬀ (1992). These all posit social orderings on
the rules themselves based on the outcomes that these rules prescribe. Rules that “select
themselves” do so on basis of selecting the same outcome as the original rule. The present
model has key two diﬀerences. First, institutional choice is explicitly dynamic. Second, the
present model trades oﬀ economic fundamentals in the public and private sectors.
Apparently, the literature on explicitly dynamic models of endogenous political institutions
is sparse. There is a larger literature discussing the historical basis for modeling institutional
change - see, for example, North (1981), Ostrom (1990), Grief and Laitin (2004), and the
extensive political science literature discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). There is also
a larger literature on static models of endogenous political rules. Examples include Conley and
Temimi (2001), Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2002), and Lizzeri and Persico (2004).
Among the dynamic models, a number of them concern the dynamic evolution of institutions
under various exogenous rationales for reform. Roberts (1998, 1999) is an early example of
this. He posits a dynamic delegation model as a way to understand progressive changes in a
society’s demographic composition. A pivotal voter in period t chooses a pivotal voter at date
t + 1. In Robert’s model the attributes of a future voter appear directly in the preferences
of the current voter. A single crossing condition on the preferences guarantees that process
of change is monotone or progressive from lower medians to higher ones. Because rules are
direct arguments of utility functions, the model is better suited to explain how, rather than
why, political institutions change.
Similarly, Justman and Gradstein (1999) examine endogenous voting rights under exogenous
20See Persson and Tabellini (2001) for other references.
19costs of disenfranchisement. Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) examine club formation
games in which players have exogenous preferences over the size or composition of the group.
As in Robert’s work, this “ﬁrst wave” is ideally designed to study the process of, rather than
the underlying rationale for, change.
The present paper bears a closer relation to a “second wave” of studies that attempt to
put micro-foundations on the dynamics of institutional change. In this literature, institutions
are instrumental choices that arise from fundamental preferences over consumption and/or
technological progress in economic tangibles. The additional step of obtaining robust and
convincing micro-foundations has proved diﬃcult. Perhaps the most inﬂuential of these second
wave contributions are a series of papers by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005). They
propose an instrumental theory to explain the process of democratization such as that which
occurred in 19th century Western Europe. The 2000 paper posits a dynamic model in which
an elite must choose each period whether or not to expand the voting franchise to the rest
of the citizenry. The elite possesses the authority to tax but cannot commit to limit future
taxes on the citizens. Because tax concessions alone cannot “buy oﬀ” the threat of an uprising,
a more permanent commitment — namely an expansion of the voting franchise is required.
The voting franchise is therefore expanded to head oﬀ social unrest. The timing of the reform
depends on, among other things, the likely success of an uprising in the absence of institutional
change. Related ideas are found in Gradstein (2007) who models an elite’s choice of current
property protection as a commitment to future property rights, and in Cervellati, et. al. (2006)
who model institutional choice in a game between competing social groups. Predatory conduct
determines the nature of the game — coordination or Prisoner’s dilemma — which, in turn,
determines how successful the institutional move toward democracy will ultimately be. Jack
and Lagunoﬀ (2006a,b) go a step further by incorporating gradualism (as found, for instance, in
Robert’s work) in an instrumental model of franchise expansion. Monotone rules of succession
are derived when individuals diﬀer by income, ideology, or both.
Though the following are not models of endogenous institutions per se, Powell (2004), Egorov
and Sonin (2005), and Gomes and Jehiel (2005) all construct interesting dynamic games in
this spirit. Powell constructs a dynamic game in which a temporarily weak government may
lack credibility to induce another government to restrain its ineﬃcient use of power such as
launching a coup or attacking. Egorov and Sonin construct a game in which a ruler’s power
may be usurped by a rival. The ruler can choose to kill a potential rival who constitutes a likely
threat. Finally, Gomes and Jehiel (2005) construct a institutional dynamic in which coalitions
form and unform over time, creating persistent ineﬃciencies along the way.
A somewhat diﬀerent type of “instrumental institution” is modeled by Lagunoﬀ (2001) who
formulates a dynamic game of endogenously chosen civil liberties. There, tolerant civil liberties
are chosen by a majority faction today in order to prevent a legal precedent for intolerance
that may be used against it by hostile majorities in the future. This self-reinforcing idea is also
found in Grief and Laitin (2004) in which institutions are self enforcing outcomes in a repeated
game.
20The common thread in all these papers is that the impetus for change comes from the
inability of a current polity to commit in advance to a future rule and thereby internalize
the social externalities created by private actions. A notable exception to this is the model
of Messner and Polborn (2004). In their model, institutional change is not driven by private
actions, but rather by dynamic inconsistencies in citizens’ preferences. They posit an OLG
model in which current voting rules determine future ones. It is assumed that a citizen’s policy
preference changes as he ages. However, the age distribution is assumed constant, and so a
pivotal voter today will be too old to remain pivotal tomorrow. For this reason, current rules
tend to select more conservative (i.e., supermajority) rules in the future. As in the benchmark
model here, change is driven by a conﬂict between the present and future pivotal voters.
The present study is a step toward unifying the literature in the following sense. It re-
interprets existing results as instances of a general phenomenon which can be understood with-
out many stylized assumptions. Namely, that all reforms arise from some form of dynamic
inconsistency in the extended aggregation process. Hence, the idea that progressive change in
the voting franchise occurs when a rule-by-oligarchic-elite is threatened by an external revolt
can be interpreted as an inconsistency between the present and future extended aggregation
process. While the current extended payoﬀ internalizes the peasants’ threat of uprising, the
extended continuation does not. Consequently, delegation of authority occurs in order to inter-
nalize the future threat.
Yet, the results are not speciﬁc to enfranchisement or any other particular type of insti-
tutional reform. Nor is it the case that a reform requires an external threat of this type. As
the Wealth-as-Power rule demonstrates, a reform can occur because common changes in the
economic state can change the de facto distribution of power in a way that leads to institutional
change.
It seems that the general link between an institution’s stability and its dynamic consis-
tency has not, to my knowledge, been broadly understood. However, considerable caution is
warranted. As the last section (Section 4.3) suggests, the mapping between primitives and the
extended rules is far from complete. Nor is it obvious that in all such cases, the re-interpretation
by means of extended aggregation will be a useful one. These issues are focal points for future
work.
6 Appendix
To ease notation, we adopt the usual convention of using primes, e.g., θ0 to denote subsequent
period’s variables, θt+1, with double primes, θ00 for θt+2, and so on.
Proof of Theorem 1 Fix a politically feasible strategy (ψ,µ). Since this strategy is ﬁxed for
the remainder of the proof we simplify notation by letting h denote a history consistent with
21θ, i.e., h = h(θ). Also, deﬁne V ∗(h) ≡ V (h;ψ,µ).
We ﬁrst show: if θ is dynamically consistent then θ is stable. Suppose, by contradiction
that θ is not stable. Then there is a set of h with positive measure such that for each such h,
µ(h) = ˜ θ 6= θ. In that case,
˜ θ ∈ argmax
θ0 F
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and, because (ψ,µ) is conservative, θ unstable implies,
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However, by BDC the inequality in (15) must be strict. Consequently, there is a set of ω0 with
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which contradicts the inequality in (16).
Next, we show: if θ is stable then θ is FDC. By stability, µ(h) = θ a.e. By political












Suppose by way of contradiction, that θ is not FDC. Then
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Notice that this does not automatically imply a contradiction because in (18) F is evaluated
under next period’s state ω0 whereas one must show that stability is violated in the current
state ω.
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Proof of Proposition 3.
We prove the second part of the Proposition — the explicit construction of a Markov equi-
librium — ﬁrst. Consider any Markov strategy (σ,ψ,µ) and any state st = (Gt,y,θt). Observe
ﬁrst that the state enters linearly in the stage payoﬀ. This means that a more convenient ex-
pression of the recursive payoﬀ function for a citizen can be derived by grouping the subsequent
period’s state with the current stage payoﬀ. Deﬁne Wi(θt; σ,ψ,µ) ≡ Vi(st;σ,ψ,µ) − Gt. One
can show that the state variable in the right hand side of this equation cancels out. Conse-
quently, Wi does not vary with Gt and can be expressed a function of θt alone. The aggregators
F and F ∗ become





































+ δ F(W(θt+1; σ,ψ,µ),θt+1)
(20)
respectively. Notice that the ﬁrst order conditions under F with respect to p, and the ﬁrst order
conditions of the Vj, j ∈ I with respect to ej all coincide with the joint ﬁrst order conditions
in p and ej, j ∈ I under F ∗. In particular, Fixing θ = yi, the ﬁrst order conditions in p and
ei, i ∈ I imply the policy and private sector strategies of the form in (11).
23Since Wi does not depend on the economic state, then with strategies in (11), the recursive
payoﬀ to citizen i is
Wi(θt; σ,ψ,µ) = (1 − δ)
h
yi(1 − B θ
1/(2γ−1)




+ δWi(θt+1; σ,ψ,µ) (21)
where A ≡ 1
4(2n − 1) δ2
(1−δ)2B2γ(
P
j yj)2γ, a positive constant.
To ﬁnd the approximate equilibrium institutional rule, µ, we guess and verify a linear
approximation θt+1 = ¯ µθt to the discrete solution. Using the equation for W in (21), the











yi(1 − B (¯ µ
τθt+1)





Clearly the set of θ∗
t+1 that maximize (22) is nonempty since they come from the ﬁnite set,
{y1,...,yn}. We obtain an approximation by taking ﬁrst order conditions with respect to θt+1.
Substituting for B and A, we verify that θ0 = ¯ µθ is an equilibrium for ¯ µ that satisﬁes (12). It
remains to show that a solution to (12) exists. To verify this ﬁnal step, observe that as ¯ µ varies
from 0 to 1, the left side (12) is continuously increasing from 0 to 1. Meanwhile, the right side
of (12) is continuously decreasing from n/(2n−1) and approaches 0 asymptotically if γ < 1/2.
If γ > 1/2, the right side of (12) is continuously increasing from n/(2n − 1) but has value less
than one at ¯ µ = 1. In either case, Brouwer’s Theorem and the Intermediate Value Theorem
imply a solution ¯ µ ∈ (0,1) exists. Given that yj − yj−1 < , it follows that ||µ(θ) − ¯ µθ|| < .
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